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THE PAYOFF REGION OF A STRATEGIC GAME AND ITS
EXTREME POINTS
YU-SUNG TU AND WEI-TORNG JUANG
Abstract. The range of a payoff function for an n-player finite strategic game
is investigated using a novel approach, the notion of extreme points of a non-
convex set. The shape of a noncooperative payoff region can be estimated using
extreme points and supporting hyperplanes of the cooperative payoff region. A
basic structural characteristic of a noncooperative payoff region is that any of
its subregions must be non-strictly convex if the subregion contains a relative
neighborhood of a point on its boundary. Besides, applying the properties
of extreme points of a noncooperative payoff region is a simple and effective
way to prove some results about Pareto efficiency and social efficiency in game
theory.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to explore the fundamental properties of noncoopera-
tive payoff regions and their potential applications. A payoff region of an n-player
finite strategic game can occur under different hypotheses about the players’ strate-
gic behavior. The cooperative payoff region achievable under correlated strategies
is the convex hull of the payoff vectors generated by pure-strategy profiles; the
noncooperative payoff region achievable under mixed-strategy profiles is a subset of
the convex polytope just described. Compared to the cooperative payoff region, the
shape of the noncooperative payoff region is usually too complex to be characterized
simply.
It is very common that a noncooperative payoff region of a two-player finite
strategic game could look like a sharp boomerang, but it would never look like
a ice cream cone (see, e.g., Binmore (2007) and Barron (2013)). Here this basic
characteristic will be proved in a mathematically rigorous manner. We introduce
the concept of extreme points of a non-convex set, and apply it to a noncooperative
payoff region. The key theorem is that for an n-player finite strategic game, any
extreme point of the cooperative payoff region is an extreme point of the noncoop-
erative payoff region, and all these extreme points can be achieved as the payoff
profiles on which the players choose pure strategies. This allows us to deduce di-
rectly that any subset of an n-dimensional noncooperative payoff region cannot be
strictly convex if it contains a relative neighborhood of a boundary point of the
payoff region.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the cooperative and noncooperative
payoff regions generated from an n-player finite strategic game have the same sup-
porting hyperplanes. Moreover, every supporting hyperplane to a noncooperative
payoff region in Rn must contain at least one extreme point of this payoff region,
no matter what the shape of this patoff region is. These results will be presented
in Section 3.
An extreme point of a noncooperative payoff region can be achieved through
the play of a pure-strategy profile, but not vice versa. We naturally compare
Key words and phrases. Noncooperative payoff region, non-strictly convex subregion, extreme
point, supporting hyperplane.
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it to the payoff profile which cannot be achieved with a non-degenerate mixed-
strategy profile. In Section 4, we give some examples to show that in fact there
is no necessary relationship between them. Finally, we present in Section 5 some
applications regarding Pareto efficiency and social efficiency in the theory of games.
These will demonstrate that the approach using the properties of extreme points of
noncooperative payoff regions is a simple and effective method of proving theorems.
2. Preliminaries and Basic Properties
We shall consider finite strategic games. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of
players. For i ∈ N , the nonempty finite set Ai is the set of pure strategies available
to player i. The set of pure-strategy profiles is the Cartesian product
∏
i∈N Ai
of the players’ pure-strategy sets. A mixed strategy σi of player i is a probability
distribution over Ai, and let ∆(Ai) denote the set of mixed strategies of player i.
The Cartesian product
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is the set of all mixed-strategy profiles. We
define a correlated strategy ϕ for n matched players to be a probability distribution
over
∏
i∈N Ai, and denote by ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai) the set of correlated strategies. Then
every mixed-strategy profile σ ∈ ∏i∈N ∆(Ai) can induce a correlated strategy ϕσ
in the way: ϕσ(a) =
∏
i∈N σi(ai) for every a ∈
∏
i∈N Ai, where σi(ai) is the
probability assigned by σi to ai. We call such a correlated strategy the induced
correlated strategy of σ.
For i ∈ N , let ui :
∏
i∈N Ai → R be the payoff function of player i. Every payoff
function ui can be extended to the set ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai) by taking the expected values
over
∏
i∈N Ai. We can also extend its domain to the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) in such a way
that the payoff value of ui at the mixed-strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is
(2.1) ui(σ) = ui(ϕσ) =
∑
a∈∏i∈N Ai
ϕσ(a)ui(a),
where ϕσ is the induced correlated strategy of σ.
1 Define the vector-valued payoff
function u :
∏
i∈N Ai → Rn by u(a) = (u1(a), . . . , un(a)). Then u can be extended
to the sets ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai) and
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) through the ui.
For i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai, let δai denote the degenerate probability (Dirac measure)
concentrated at ai. It is clear that a pure-strategy profile a = (a1, . . . , an) will
correspond to its mixed-strategy profile σa = (δa1 , . . . , δan), and we have
u(σa) = u(a).
So we can embed the set of pure-strategy profiles into the set of mixed-strategy
profiles. In fact, such a relationship also exists between the set of mixed-strategy
profiles and the set of correlated strategies. The following lemma shows that distinct
mixed-strategy profiles correspond to distinct correlated strategies.
Lemma 2.1. In a finite strategic game, the set of all mixed-strategy profiles and
the set of all induced correlated strategies are in one-to-one correspondence.
Proof. Let |Ai| = mi for each i ∈ N . Define f :
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) → ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai) by
f(p) = ϕp, where p = (p1, . . . , pn), pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
mi
i ) for all i ∈ N , and ϕp is the
induced correlated strategy of p. It is clear that the range of f is the set of all
1The following is an equivalent definition for ui extended to the set of mixed-strategy profiles:
for any σ ∈∏i∈N ∆(Ai), let
ui(σ) =
∑
a1∈A1
· · ·
∑
an∈An
σ1(a1) · · ·σn(an)ui(a1, . . . , an).
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induced correlated strategies. To see that f is injective, suppose that f(p) = f(q).
Then
∏
i∈N p
ri
i =
∏
i∈N q
ri
i for any (ri)i∈N with 1 ≤ ri ≤ mi. The fact that
mj∑
rj=1
p
rj
j
∏
i∈N\{j}
prii =
mj∑
rj=1
q
rj
j
∏
i∈N\{j}
qrii
for each j ∈ N and for each (ri)i∈N\{j} with 1 ≤ ri ≤ mi implies that the equality∏
i∈N\{j} p
ri
i =
∏
i∈N\{j} q
ri
i holds for any j ∈ N and for any (ri)i∈N\{j} with
1 ≤ ri ≤ mi.
Again, we use the fact that
mk∑
rk=1
prkk
∏
i∈N\{j,k}
prii =
mk∑
rk=1
qrkk
∏
i∈N\{j,k}
qrii
for each j, k ∈ N and for each (ri)i∈N\{j,k} with 1 ≤ ri ≤ mi. This fact implies the
equality
∏
i∈N\{j,k} p
ri
i =
∏
i∈N\{j,k} q
ri
i for any j, k ∈ N and for any (ri)i∈N\{j,k}
with 1 ≤ ri ≤ mi. Repeat this process. The pattern is clear, and eventually we
reach the conclusion that prii = q
ri
i for each i ∈ N and for each ri ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}. 
Therefore, applying the payoff relation (2.1), we can embed the set of mixed-
strategy profiles into the set of correlated strategies.
Remark 2.1.1. In every finite strategic game, the set
∏
i∈N Ai can be considered
as embedded in the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai); the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) can be considered as
embedded in the set ∆(
∏
i∈N Ai).
3. Noncooperative Payoff Regions
A payoff region of a game can occur under different hypotheses about what
players will be able to do. It is well known that the payoff region may be very far
from convex when the players choose their strategies independently. It would be
helpful if we could obtain further information about the shape of a noncooperative
payoff region.
In this section, the concept of extreme points of a non-convex set is introduced,
and we apply it to a noncooperative payoff region, together with supporting hyper-
planes. This approach can give us valuable insight into understanding the general
shape of a non-convex payoff region.
Definition 3.1. Let (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a finite strategic game. The three
ranges u(
∏
i∈N Ai), u(
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai)), and u(∆(
∏
i∈N Ai)) are denoted respectively
by Spu, Snc, and Sco, and are called respectively the pure-payoff region, the nonco-
operative payoff region, and the cooperative payoff region.
From Section 2, we know that Spu ⊆ Snc ⊆ Sco. The pure-payoff region Spu is
a finite subset of Rn, and the convex hull of Spu, denoted by conv(Spu), is just the
cooperative payoff region Sco, a convex polytope in Rn. The noncooperative payoff
region Snc is a colsed subset of Sco, and it is also a set of generators of Sco, that is,
(3.1) Sco = conv(Spu) = conv(Snc).
In this paper, we shall provide more of the basic features of a noncooperative payoff
region.
First, we show that the noncooperative payoff region of an n-player finite strate-
gic game is a closed, bounded, and connected subset of Rn.
Lemma 3.2. Let (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a finite strategic game. Then the non-
cooperative payoff region Snc is path-connected and compact.
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Proof. Suppose that Ai = {a1i , . . . , amii } for every i ∈ N . Then the set ∆(Ai) can
be identified with the standard (mi − 1)-simplex ∆mi−1. For each j ∈ N , define
Uj :
∏
i∈N Rmi → R by
Uj(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
(a
r1
1 ,...,a
rn
n )∈
∏
i∈N Ai
xr11 · · ·xrnn uj(ar11 , . . . , arnn ),
where xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
mi
i ) ∈ Rmi for every i ∈ N . Define the vector-valued function
U :
∏
i∈N Rmi → Rn by
U(x1, . . . , xn) = (U1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Un(x1, . . . , xn))
for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
i∈N Rmi . Then U is a continuous function with respect
to the Euclidean metric topologies on
∏
i∈N Rmi and Rn. Obviously, the set∏
i∈N ∆
mi−1 is a path-connected, compact subset of
∏
i∈N Rmi . We see that the
noncooperative payoff region Snc is path-connected and compact, since this region
is the image of
∏
i∈N ∆
mi−1 under the continuous function U . 
We now propose a simple approach to describe the shape of a noncooperative
payoff region by its extreme points and supporting hyperplanes.
Extreme Points. Extreme points of convex sets play an important role in convex
analysis, but here we extend the concept of extreme points to non-convex sets. This
simple extension turns out to be very useful in some applications such as describing
the shape of a noncooperative payoff region, and it provides an efficient approach
for analysis of Pareto efficiency and social efficiency in game theory; see Section 5.
Under the notion of extreme points of a convex set, any corner point of a closed
convex polygon is an extreme point. When a non-convex set is considered, a minor
modification is required in order to retain this property, as described below.
Definition 3.3. Let S be a nonempty subset of Rn. 2 A point x ∈ S is called an
extreme point of S if
(3.2) x ∈ { θy + (1− θ)z | θ ∈ (0, 1) } ⊂ S
with y, z ∈ S implies that x = y = z. Let ext(S) denote the set of all extreme
points of S.
This means that an extreme point of S is a point in S which is not an interior
point of any line segment contained in S. Because the subset S in Definition 3.3
may or may not be convex, it is not sufficient to check whether the point x can
lie in the interior of the line segment joining two distinct points of S; it must
also be checked that the line segment is contained in S, that is, the condition
{ θy + (1 − θ)z | θ ∈ (0, 1) } ⊂ S in (3.2) is required. 3 A closed set may have no
extreme points (e.g., a closed half-plane), a finite number of extreme points (e.g.,
a closed polygon), or an infinite number of extreme points (e.g., a closed disk).
Remark 3.3.1. An interior point of a subset S of Rn cannot be an extreme point of
S. In other words, all extreme points must be boundary points.
The next lemma is the fundamental result concerning the existence of extreme
points of a nonempty compact set; see Ichiishi (1983, p. 21).
Lemma 3.4. Every nonempty compact subset of Rn has extreme points.
2We do not assume the subset S of Rn to be convex in this definition.
3As we will see in Example 4.2, the corner point (2, 2) of the non-convex polygon is, by
Definition 3.3, an extreme point (see Figure 2), although the point (2, 2) can be written as a
convex combination of two distinct points in the polygon.
THE PAYOFF REGION OF A STRATEGIC GAME AND ITS EXTREME POINTS 5
A basic property of convex sets in Rn states that any compact convex subset
K ⊂ Rn is the convex hull of its extreme points, that is, K = conv(ext(K)).
In addition, for every compact subset S ⊂ K such that conv(S) = K, we have
ext(K) ⊆ S. These are obvious consequences of the Krein–Milman theorem and
Milman’s theorem in a finite-dimensional case (see, e.g., Rudin (1973, pp. 75–76)).
Thus, for a given finite strategic game, the equations in (3.1) lead to the relations:
Sco = conv(ext(Sco)) and ext(Sco) ⊆ Spu ⊆ Snc.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the relevant properties of a non-
cooperative payoff region. The following theorem states the relations between the
extreme points of Snc and other payoff points, which will play a central role in
numerous applications.
Theorem 3.5. Let (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a finite strategic game. Then
∅ 6= ext(Sco) ⊆ ext(Snc) ⊆ Spu.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, we have ext(Sco) 6= ∅. To show that ext(Sco) ⊆ ext(Snc), let
v ∈ ext(Sco). Then v ∈ Snc because it is known that ext(Sco) ⊂ Snc. If v /∈ ext(Snc),
then there exist distinct points x, y ∈ Snc such that v = λx + (1 − λ)y for some
λ ∈ (0, 1). Since the convex set Sco contains Snc, we obtain that v /∈ ext(Sco), a
contradiction.
Next we show that ext(Snc) ⊆ Spu. Let v ∈ ext(Snc) and suppose that v = u(σ)
for some mixed-strategy profile σ ∈∏i∈N ∆(Ai). Assuming Ai = (a1i , . . . , amii ) for
each i ∈ N , the following decomposition holds: for some j ∈ N ,
v = α1ju(a
1
j , σ−j) + (1− α1j )
(
mj∑
t=2
αtj
1− α1j
u(atj , σ−j)
)
,
where αtj = σj(a
t
j) for t = 1, . . . ,mj . Since v ∈ ext(Snc) and the closed line segment
joining u(a1j , σ−j) and
∑mj
t=2
αtj
1−α1j u(a
t
j , σ−j) is contained in Snc, we have
v = u(a1j , σ−j) =
mj∑
t=2
αtj
1− α1j
u(atj , σ−j).
If (a1j , σ−j) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai, then v ∈ Spu and we are done. Otherwise, we proceed by
decomposing the mixed-strategy profile (a1j , σ−j) as above. Continue this process.
Since the set N is finite, eventually we will reach the conclusion that v = u(a) for
some a ∈∏i∈N Ai. 
It is well known that the case of a two-dimensional noncooperative payoff region
with a curved boundary is very common, as we will see in Section 4. Some curved
part of the boundary would look like a parabola, which is the envelope of a family
of line segments generated by players’ mixed strategies. This indicates that the
noncooperative payoff region is always outside such a parabola. Thus any subre-
gion containing a relative neighborhood of a boundary point of the noncooperative
payoff region cannot be strictly convex. This assertion can be generalized to higher
dimensions, and it can be easily proved using Theorem 3.5, as stated below.
Remark 3.5.1. First note that in Rn boundary points and extreme points coincide
if a set is strictly convex. For an n-player finite strategic game, Theorem 3.5 points
out that the noncooperative payoff region Snc has only a finite number of extreme
points. So any subregion must be non-strictly convex, provided that the subregion
contains a relative neighborhood of a boundary point of Snc.
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Every closed convex set in Rn can be represented by closed half-spaces. Accord-
ingly, for any n-player finite strategic game, the cooperative payoff region Sco is
the intersection of all closed half-spaces containing it. Similarly, the convex hull of
the noncooperative payoff region, conv(Snc), can be expressed as the intersection
of all closed half-spaces containing Snc (see, e.g., Rockafellar (1970, p. 99)). The
fact that Sco equals conv(Snc) gives us a motivation to characterize Snc in terms of
the supporting hyperplanes to Sco.
Supporting Hyperplanes. For any given c ∈ Rn \ {0} and α ∈ R, the set
H = {x ∈ Rn | c · x = α }
is called a hyperplane in Rn. The sets
H− = {x ∈ Rn | c · x ≤ α } and H+ = {x ∈ Rn | c · x ≥ α }
are called the closed half-spaces determined by H.
Definition 3.6. Let S be a nonempty closed subset of Rn. A hyperplane H is said
to be a supporting hyperplane to S if S ∩H 6= ∅ and S is contained in one of the
two closed half-spaces determined by H.
Lemma 3.7. Let S1 and S2 be nonempty closed subsets of Rn satisfying conv(S1) =
conv(S2). Then the sets S1 and S2 have the same supporting hyperplanes.
Proof. Let H = {x ∈ Rn | c·x = α } be a supporting hyperplane to S1, and suppose
that S1 ⊆ H+. Since H+ is a convex set and conv(S1) is the smallest convex set
containing S1, we have S1 ⊆ conv(S1) ⊆ H+. Thus S2 ⊆ conv(S2) ⊆ H+.
Let x¯ ∈ S1 ∩ H. This implies that x¯ ∈ conv(S2) and c · x¯ = α. So x¯ can be
written as a convex combination x¯ =
∑k
t=1 λtyt of some points y1, . . . , yk ∈ S2
where λ1 + · · · + λk = 1 and λt > 0 for all t, and then we get
∑k
t=1 λtc · yt = α.
Since each yt ∈ S2 and S2 ⊆ H+, the relation c · yt ≥ α holds for each t. It follows
that c · yt = α for every t, and then yt ∈ S2 ∩H for every t. Therefore, H is also a
supporting hyperplane to S2. 
That the noncooperative and cooperative payoff regions of a finite strategic game
have the same supporting hyperplanes is a direct result of Lemma 3.7.
Theorem 3.8. Let (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a finite strategic game. Then a hyper-
plane H in Rn is a supporting hyperplane to Snc if and only if it is a supporting
hyperplane to Sco.
An important property of convex sets is that every supporting hyperplane to
a nonempty compact convex subset K of Rn contains at least one extreme point
of K (see, e.g., Moore (1999, p. 303)). Hence, every supporting hyperplane to
a convex polytope Sco must have an extreme point of Sco. Likewise, although a
noncooperative payoff region Snc may not be convex, every supporting hyperplane
to Snc also contains at least one extreme point of Snc, which can be achieved by
using a pure-strategy profile, in fact.
Corollary 3.9. Let (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a finite strategic game. Then every
supporting hyperplane to Snc contains at least one extreme point of Snc.
Proof. Let H be a supporting hyperplane to Snc. Then H is also a supporting
hyperplane to Sco by Theorem 3.8, and thus it contains an extreme point of Sco.
Since the relation ext(Sco) ⊆ ext(Snc) holds by Theorem 3.5, we can conclude that
the hyperplane H must contain an extreme point of Snc. 
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4. Examples of Extreme Points of Payoff Regions
We now give some examples of extreme points of payoff regions. As shown
below, these examples reveal that all “convex corners” of a non-convex set are
extreme points, and thus the definition of an extreme point of a non-convex set in
this paper is intuitively reasonable.
It is notable that an extreme point of a payoff region is achieved as a payoff profile
on which players, instead of selecting pure strategies, may choose mixed strategies.
In this section, we further clarify the relations among extreme points, pure-payoff
profiles, and non-mixable payoff profiles. Here a pure-payoff profile refers to a payoff
profile generated by choosing pure strategies; a non-mixable payoff profile refers to
a payoff profile that can be generated only by a pure-strategy profile.
Example 4.1. Consider the following two-player game.
a21 a22
a11 0, 1 5, 2
a12 2, 5 1, 0
We can see that ext(Sco) = ext(Snc) = Spu. The noncooperative payoff region of
this game is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. ext(Sco) = ext(Snc) = Spu.
Example 4.2. Consider the following two-player game.
a21 a22 a23
a11 0, 2 0, 1 0, 0
a12 3, 0 3, 2 2, 2
It is easy to see that ext(Sco) = {(0, 0), (3, 0), (3, 2), (0, 2)}, ext(Snc) = ext(Sco) ∪
{(2, 2)}, and Spu = ext(Snc) ∪ {(0, 1)}. Hence ext(Sco)  ext(Snc)  Spu. The
noncooperative payoff region of this game is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. ext(Sco)  ext(Snc)  Spu.
For a finite strategic game (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), a payoff profile v ∈ Rn is called
mixable if it can be generated by a non-degenerate mixed-strategy profile, that is,
v ∈
{
u(σ)
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ ∏
i∈N
∆(Ai) \
∏
i∈N
Ai
}
.
A payoff profile is said to be non-mixable if it can be generated only by a pure-
strategy profile, and it is certainly a pure-payoff profile. However, a pure-payoff
profile is not necessarily non-mixable. For example, the pure-payoff pair (0, 1) in
Figure 2 is mixable. On the other hand, all the extreme points in Figures 1 and 2
are non-mixable. Nevertheless, as the following example shows, an extreme point of
a noncooperative payoff region and a non-mixable payoff profile of a finite strategic
game are not the same thing.
Example 4.3. Consider the following two-player game G1.
a21 a22
a11 0, 0 0, 0
a12 −1, −1 1, −1
Obviously, the payoff pair (0, 0) of G1 is mixable, and it is an extreme point of the
noncooperative payoff region of G1.
4 In addition, a non-mixable payoff profile
may not be an extreme point of a noncooperative payoff region, as shown in the
following two-player game G2.
a21 a22
a11 −1, 0 0, −1
a12 0, 0 1, 0
It is easy to check that the payoff pair (0, 0) of G2 is non-mixable, and it is not
an extreme point of the noncooperative payoff region of G2, which is illustrated in
Figure 3.
4The noncooperative payoff region of G1 is a triangle with vertices (0, 0), (−1,−1), and (1,−1).
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Figure 3. The non-mixable payoff pair (0, 0) is not an extreme point of Snc.
In convex analysis, a basic result, called the supporting hyperplane theorem,
states that if x is a boundary point of a closed convex subset C of Rn, then there
exists at least one supporting hyperplane to C at x (see, e.g., Boyd and Vanden-
berghe (2004, p. 51)). By applying Remark 3.3.1, we obtain that for a cooperative
payoff region Sco, there exists a supporting hyperplane passing through any given
extreme point of Sco. In contrast to Corollary 3.9, this need not be the case for a
noncooperative payoff region as indicated in the example below.
Example 4.4. Consider the following two-player game.
a21 a22 a23
a11 4, 4 0, 0 0, 0
a12 0, 0 8, 2 0, 0
a13 0, 0 0, 0 2, 8
We can see that the payoff pair (4, 4) is an extreme point of Snc, and it is an interior
point of Sco. Hence, applying Theorem 3.8, there exists no supporting hyperplane
to Snc passing through the point (4, 4), which can be seen in Figure 4.
5. Applications
The study of extreme points of a non-convex set not only helps us to describe the
shape of a noncooperative payoff region, but enables us to efficiently prove some
results about Pareto efficiency and social efficiency in the theory of games.
Definition 5.1. A point w ∈ Rn Pareto dominates a point v ∈ Rn if w 6= v and
wi ≥ vi for i = 1, . . . , n. Let S be a nonempty subset of Rn. The Pareto frontier
of S is defined as
P (S) = { v ∈ S | {w ∈ S | w Pareto dominates v } = ∅ }.
In other words, a point v on the Pareto frontier of S means that v ∈ S and there
is no other point w ∈ S such that wi ≥ vi for all i. For a finite strategic game,
we will say more about a payoff pair on the Pareto frontier of the noncooperative
payoff region in what follows.
On the Payoff Pairs with Horizontal/Vertical Tangents. According to May-
nard Smith (1982) and Vickers and Cannings (1987), an evolutionarily stable strat-
egy is defined as a strategy adopted by all individuals with the property that no
mutant strategy can invade under the influence of natural selection if the popula-
tion share of mutants is smaller than an invasion barrier. The indirect evolutionary
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Figure 4. The extreme point (4, 4) of Snc is an interior point of Sco.
approach is a branch of evolutionary game theory in which individuals are char-
acterized by preferences rather than pre-programmed strategies. It has received
significant attention because, underlying this evolutionary approach with observ-
able preferences, efficiency is a necessary condition for outcomes to be stable (see,
e.g., Gu¨th and Yaari (1992), Samuelson (2001), and Dekel et al. (2007)).
When we check whether a Pareto-efficient strategy pair is stable in an indirect
evolutionary two-population model, mutant strategy pairs may have the following
property: one mutant type in a mutant pair receives more than the incumbents
in one population, and the other mutant type receives less than the incumbents in
the other population. Even though any such mutant pair would always be driven
out if its population share is lower than its corresponding barrier, the existence
of a uniform invasion barrier is still ambiguous, especially as the strategies of the
mutants and the incumbents get closer and closer to each other.
This argument prompted us to pay attention to the sequence of the mutant
pairs in which the two fitness gaps with the incumbents in the two populations
respectively will be closed in opposite directions. In fact, the situation that the
corresponding invasion barrier could become arbitrarily small will imply that the
trailing gap, caused by mutants trailing behind the incumbents in one population,
actually closes faster than the leading gap, caused by leading mutants in the other
population. But this contradicts the shape of a noncooperative payoff region. Thus
no such mutant strategy pairs can exist.
For a more precise statement of this result, let Snc ⊂ R2 be a noncooperative
payoff region of a two-player finite strategic game, and let (v∗1 , v
∗
2) be a payoff pair
in Snc. Suppose that {(vt1, vt2)} is a sequence of payoff pairs in Snc converging to
(v∗1 , v
∗
2) with v
t
1−v∗1 > 0, defining a leading gap, and v∗2−vt2 > 0, defining a trailing
gap, for each t. If the curve connecting the sequence has a horizontal tangent line
at (v∗1 , v
∗
2), then the payoff pair (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) will not lie on the Pareto frontier of Snc,
as in Figure 5. The intuitive reason for this is clear: if (v∗1 , v
∗
2) is Pareto efficient
relative to Snc and the sequence satisfying the above conditions exists, then there
would be a strictly convex subregion of Snc containing this sequence, and it would
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contradict Remark 3.5.1. We will give a rigorous proof below using the properties
of noncooperative payoff regions discussed in Section 3.
Figure 5. The payoff pair (1, 2) will not lie on the Pareto frontier of Snc.
The actual noncooperative payoff region is often too involved, even though there
are just two players in a game. Here is another way of determining whether a payoff
pair does not lie on the Pareto frontier of a noncooperative payoff region.
Theorem 5.2. Let ({1, 2}, A1, A2, u1, u2) be a two-player finite strategic game.
Suppose that {(vt1, vt2)} is a sequence in Snc which converges to (v∗1 , v∗2) ∈ Snc and
satisfies vt1 > v
∗
1 and v
∗
2 > v
t
2 for all t. If the condition
lim
t→∞
vt2 − v∗2
vt1 − v∗1
= 0
holds, then (v∗1 , v
∗
2) /∈ P (Snc).
Proof. Suppose that (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ P (Snc). This means that for each (x1, x2) ∈ Snc, we
have v∗2 > x2 if x1 > v
∗
1 , and v
∗
2 ≥ x2 if x1 = v∗1 . Since ext(Snc) is a finite set by
Theorem 3.5, we can pick vk1 such that
(5.1) { (x1, x2) ∈ ext(Snc) | v∗1 < x1 < vk1 } = ∅.
By the compactness of Snc (see Lemma 3.2), we can choose v¯
k
2 = max{β ∈ R |
(vk1 , β) ∈ Snc }, and then vk2 ≤ v¯k2 < v¯∗2 . Consider the compact set
A = { (x1, x2) ∈ Snc | v∗1 ≤ x1 ≤ vk1 },
and define a linear function f : A→ R by
f(x1, x2) = (v
∗
2 − v¯k2 )x1 + (vk1 − v∗1)x2.
Under our assumptions, f achieves its maximum on A, say m. Furthermore, it
is true that (x1, x2) ∈ f−1(m) implies v∗1 < x1 < vk1 , which is obvious from the
assumption that limt→∞
vt2−v∗2
vt1−v∗1 = 0, and from the fact that the level curves of f are
parallel straight line segments with slope
v¯k2−v∗2
vk1−v∗1
.
We claim ext(f−1(m)) ⊆ ext(Snc). To see this, assume that (x¯1, x¯2) ∈ f−1(m)
and (x¯1, x¯2) /∈ ext(Snc). Then v∗1 < x¯1 < vk1 , and we can choose distinct points
(y1, y2), (z1, z2) ∈ A such that
(x¯1, x¯2) ∈ { θ(y1, y2) + (1− θ)(z1, z2) | θ ∈ (0, 1) } ⊂ A.
The fact that (x¯1, x¯2) ∈ f−1(m) implies that (y1, y2), (z1, z2) ∈ f−1(m), and thus
θ(y1, y2) + (1− θ)(z1, z2) ∈ f−1(m) for every θ ∈ (0, 1). This means that (x¯1, x¯2) /∈
ext(f−1(m)). Moreover, since f−1(m) is compact, the set ext(f−1(m)) is nonempty
by Lemma 3.4. Therefore we get the relations
∅ 6= ext(f−1(m)) ⊆ ext(Snc) ∩ { (x1, x2) ∈ Snc | v∗1 < x1 < vk1 },
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contradicting (5.1). 
Remark 5.2.1. By mirror symmetry, there should be a result corresponding to
Theorem 5.2. That is, if a sequence {(vt1, vt2)} in Snc converges to (v∗1 , v∗2) ∈ Snc
satisfying vt1 < v
∗
1 and v
∗
2 < v
t
2 for all t, then the limit point (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) does not lie on
the Pareto frontier of Snc, provided that the curve connecting the sequence has a
vertical tangent line at (v∗1 , v
∗
2).
On the Rational Payoff Regions. In some environments, like infinitely repeated
games, the coefficients used in a convex combination of pure-payoff profiles are
sometimes restricted to rational numbers. For an n-player finite strategic game,
we denote by SQco the set of all convex combinations with rational coefficients of
the pure-payoff profiles. Similarly, we denote by SQnc the set of all payoff profiles
achievable with rational mixed-strategy profiles. 5 Then SQco is dense in Sco, and
SQnc is dense in Snc.
If σ is a rational mixed-strategy profile and u(σ) ∈ P (Snc), then it is clear that
u(σ) ∈ P (SQnc). Conversely, if the payoff profile u(σ) lies on the Pareto frontier of
SQnc, which is dense in Snc, do we get the result that u(σ) ∈ P (Snc)? In a two-player
finite strategic game, the answer is yes and it also holds for a cooperative payoff
region, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 5.3. Let ({1, 2}, A1, A2, u1, u2) be a two-player finite strategic game.
Then P (SQnc) ⊆ P (Snc) and P (SQco) ⊆ P (Sco).
Proof. The proofs of these two cases are similar; we only show that P (SQnc) ⊆
P (Snc). Let v ∈ SQnc and v /∈ P (Snc). Then there exists w ∈ Snc such that w Pareto
dominates v. If w1 > v1 and w2 > v2, then since S
Q
nc is dense in Snc, we can choose
x¯ ∈ SQnc such that x¯1 > v1 and x¯2 > v2, which means that v /∈ P (SQnc).
Otherwise, without loss of generality, we assume that w1 > v1 and w2 = v2.
Since Snc is a compact set (see Lemma 3.2), we can take
w¯1 = max{α ∈ R | (α, v2) ∈ Snc },
and then we have w¯1 ≥ w1 > v1. If (w¯1, v2) ∈ ext(Snc), then, by Theorem 3.5, the
point (w¯1, v2) is a pure-payoff pair, and hence (w¯1, v2) ∈ SQnc. Therefore v /∈ P (SQnc).
If (w¯1, v2) /∈ ext(Snc), we can choose two distinct points u, u′ ∈ Snc such that
(w¯1, v2) ∈ { θu+ (1− θ)u′ | θ ∈ (0, 1) } ⊂ Snc.
The way in which w¯1 is chosen leads to u2 6= v2 and u′2 6= v2. Without loss of
generality, assume that u2 > v2. Since w¯1 > v1, we can always choose λ ∈ (0, 1)
such that the point (x1, x2) = λ(w¯1, v2)+(1−λ)u belongs to Snc, and the conditions
x1 > v1 and x2 > v2 are satisfied. Again, since S
Q
nc is dense in Snc, there exists
x¯ ∈ SQnc such that x¯ strictly Pareto dominates v, that is, v /∈ P (SQnc). 
The relations in the above theorem seem intuitively clear, because for every
payoff profile, it is either achieved using rational coefficients or arbitrarily close to
one with rational coefficients. But the above results cannot be extended to general
n-player games. Here we provide a counterexample for n = 3.
The main idea for the counterexample is caused by the above proof. Note that
in the last case, we can always choose a point on the line segment containing the
non-extreme point and contained in the payoff region such that the rational payoff
pair is strictly Pareto dominated. However, this may not be done if the payoff
region is generated from a multi-player game rather than from a two-player game.
5A mixed strategy σi for player i is rational if all values of σi are rational numbers. A mixed-
strategy profile σ is rational if all its mixed strategies are rational.
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Example 5.4. Consider the following three-player game, where the payoff function
is denoted by u. Figure 6 shows the noncooperative payoff region Snc of this game.
a21 a22
a11
√
2, −1, 1 0, 0, −1
a12 0, 0, −1 −2,
√
2, 1
a31
a21 a22
a11
√
2, −1, 1 0, 0, −1
a12 0, 0, −1 −2,
√
2, 1
a32
The strategy a11 is strictly dominant for player 1; the strategy a22 is strictly dom-
inant for player 2; the actions of player 3 have no effect on their payoffs. Let
σ∗ be a Nash equilibrium, in which the players choose their strategies indepen-
dently. Then σ∗1 = a11, σ
∗
2 = a22, and σ
∗
3 is one of the possible strategies of the
player 3. Therefore, u(σ∗) = (0, 0,−1). We claim that u(σ∗) ∈ P (SQnc). Neverthe-
less, u(σ∗) /∈ P (Snc) and u(σ∗) /∈ P (Sco), as shown in Figure 6.
To verify the claim, we show that u(σ∗) ∈ P (SQco); thus, since u(σ∗) ∈ SQnc and
SQnc ⊆ SQco, we have u(σ∗) ∈ P (SQnc). Let ϕ be a correlated strategy with the
property that u(ϕ) Pareto dominates u(σ∗). This implies that
ϕ(a11, a21, a31) + ϕ(a11, a21, a32) =
√
2[ϕ(a12, a22, a31) + ϕ(a12, a22, a32)],
and ϕ(a1j , a2j , a31) + ϕ(a1j , a2j , a32) 6= 0 for j = 1, 2. Therefore, u(ϕ) /∈ SQco, and
so we can conclude that u(σ∗) ∈ P (SQco).
Figure 6. P (SQco) * P (Sco); P (SQnc) * P (Snc).
On the Social Efficiency. Pareto efficiency only guarantees that no one can
become better off without making someone else worse off. A situation would still
be Pareto efficient despite huge disparities among individuals. To reduce inequality
in the distribution of utilities, the goal of a decision maker is to select the point on
the Pareto frontier that gives the highest social welfare. However, because there are
multiple conceptions of inequality, there is no simple criterion for choosing among
those diverse social welfare functions.
Here, for a finite strategic game (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), we consider a weighted
utilitarian social welfare function W : Snc → R defined by
W (v) =
∑
i∈N
αivi,
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which is one of the most widely used methods for aggregation of individual utilities.
It can be shown that the maximum value of the weighted utilitarian social welfare
function can be achieved under a pure-strategy profile, although the shape of a
noncooperative payoff region is unclear. Before explaining this, let us first review
the importance of extreme points in convex analysis.
Extreme points play a crucial role in solving convex optimization problems as
described below. A continuous convex function on a compact convex subset of Rn
will always attain its maximum at an extreme point of the subset (see, e.g., Alipran-
tis and Border (2006, p. 298)). This is known as the Bauer Maximum Principle.
It should be emphasized that this result does not mean that all maximizers are
extreme points.
Now let the social welfare function W be extended to the domain Sco, a com-
pact convex subset of Rn. Then there exists v0 ∈ ext(Sco) such that W (v0) =
max{W (v) | v ∈ Sco }. By Theorem 3.5, we know that ext(Sco) ⊆ ext(Snc) ⊆ Spu.
Therefore, the relations Spu ⊆ Snc ⊆ Sco imply that
W (v0) = max{W (v) | v ∈ Snc } = max{W (v) | v ∈ Spu }.
Thus, for the weighted utilitarian social welfare function defined on a noncoopera-
tive payoff region, its maximum value can be obtained by means of a pure-strategy
profile, no matter what the shape of this payoff region is.
6. Conclusion
For every n-player finite strategic game, the cooperative payoff region is a convex
polytope in Rn, and the noncooperative payoff region is a compact connected subset
of this polytope. A corner of the cooperative payoff region is a convex corner of
the noncooperative payoff region; but not vice versa. This indicates that the two
payoff regions have the same supporting hyperplanes.
In addition, although the boundary of a payoff region may have a very complex
structure when the players choose their strategies independently, there is one re-
markable characteristic common to all noncooperative payoff regions: any subregion
must be non-strictly convex if it contains a relative neighborhood of a boundary
point of the noncooperative payoff region.
In this paper, we study them in a strict mathematical way. Besides, the proper-
ties of extreme points of a noncooperative payoff region also allow us to efficiently
prove some new properties, such as the theorems in Section 5. This approach not
only provides rigorous proofs for obvious assertions, but also helps to clarify some
questions to which the intuition gives no good answers. These fully demonstrate
that it can be an effective and efficient approach for research purposes.
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